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Abstract 
The Italian logistics suffer a strong competitive gap in comparison with the other European 
countries. This performance deficit generates 7.5 billion euro additional congestion costs 
for the Italian system: the reduction of the logistic costs would have a remarkable impact on 
the competitiveness of the Italian undertakings. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to 
start effective policies in order to mind the gap with the competitors and to remove the 
infrastructural bottlenecks. In order to take up these challenges, two main knots must be 
untied: the infrastructure financing and the impact of the structure of the logistic sector on 
the overall system performance. As regards the former issue, the situation is very critical 
for those Member States (Italy) reporting infrastructure gap: the evolution of EU scenario 
pushes towards a more and more intense pressure on the public spending containment. With 
regard to the latter, Italy suffers from a low average dimension of the logistic operators. 




It is well known that an efficient system of transport is a necessary prerequisite for the 
development of a national economic system. Transport networks endowed with capillarity 
and absence of congestion problems permit to achieve both the economic development and 
the improvement of the social cohesion between central and peripheral areas of a Country 
and an increase of the competitiveness of the productive and entrepreneurial tissue. 
Among the other factors for the attainment of good performance of the transport system, 
the logistics represent one of the most important variables. The aim of the paper is to 
understand the reasons of the competitiveness issues of the Italian logistic system in order 
to work out industrial policy interventions directed to mind the gap in comparison with the 
other European Countries systems. 
To  achieve  this  aim,  the  first  step  is  represented  by  the  need  to  provide  a  synthetic 
representation of the main characteristics of the Italian system (§ 2). In this way, it will be 
possible  to  underline  its  main  criticality  and  the  knots  that  should  be  solved  for  its 
revitalization. In this perspective, the analysis of other EU Member States experiences, as 
far as the logistic policies are concerned, will be useful to understand the directions taken 
by  the  competitors  and,  thus,  to  identify  best  practices  (§  3  and  §  4).  The  policy 
implications deriving from the complex scenario described and the consequent positive 
intervention proposals will conclude the paper (§ 5). 
 
2. A synthetic picture of the Italian transport and logistic system: the dimensions of 
the infrastructure gap 
The Italian transport and logistic system is characterized by a strong modal imbalance; the 
data on the distribution of the goods traffic witnesses a strong predominance of the road 
(65.6%) in comparison with the other modes (waterways: 17.6%; air: 0.5%; fixed plants: 
16.3%). Furthermore, a  considerable percentage of the transport is  concentrated on the 
highway infrastructure: although the highway network represents only 1.2% of the total 
road extension, it holds yearly a remarkable percentage of the freight (42%) and passenger 
(11%) volumes. 
The  problem  is  that,  in  the  last  fifteen  years,  the  traffic  volumes  on  the  highway 
infrastructure  in  concession  –  representing  86%  of  the  whole  Italian  network  –  have 
increased at  extremely  high rates with  an overall variation in  the period 1990-2008 of 
52.9%. This evolution is ascribable both to the light and the heavy vehicles, even if the 
latter have had a stronger role than the former ones. On the contrary, in the same period, the 
highway network has not increased substantially in terms of length (the total extent passed 
from 6,185 km of 1990 to 6,532 of 2008).    3 
A stronger increase, above all in the first part of the 1990s’, may be observed with regard to 
the network capacity in terms of number of lanes for each carriageway. The total amount of 
network kilometers in concession with three lanes passed from 1,106 of 1990 to the present 
1,460 representing about the 25% of the network. This percentage decreases to 22% if the 
part of network managed by ANAS is considered. 
The  different  trend  characterizing  mobility  demand  and  infrastructures  supply  in  the 
highways  segment  suggests  that  the  Italian  network  is  now  facing  a  remarkable 
infrastructural deficit contributing to reduce the competitiveness of the Country-system in 
comparison with the other European Member States. 
The result of this process is very clear observing the data contained in table n. 1: for each 
kilometer  of  highways,  5,737  vehicles  circulates  on  the  Italian  network.  This  value  is 
almost twice higher than the ones recorded in France and Germany and three times the 
Spanish one. On the contrary, the density of the highway network on the total population 
shows data far lower than the other EU large member States. 
 
Table 1 – Indicators of infrastructural equipment in the main European Countries (2008) 
Countries 
 
Circulation density (vehicles/ 
km) 
Density on the population 
(km/ mil. inhabitants) 
Highways  Main road 
network 
Highways  Main road 
network 
France  3,348  665  175.4  883.3 
Germany  3,805  1,243  151.6  464.1 
Italy  5,737  1,255  113.6  519.4 
UK  8,080  660  61.1  748.0 
Spain  2,221  842  251.3  662.8 
EU-15  3,816  826  147.6  682.0 
EU-25  4,047  821  131.4  647.5 
Source: Autostrade per l’Italia 
The above quoted modal imbalance is favoured by the particular structure of the Italian 
transport demand, which is characterized by the predominance of the short range journeys. 
The percentage  distribution of the heavy freight transport on the Italian highways managed 
by Autostrade per l’Italia shows the following values
1: 
  25.8% of the traffic concerns journeys that are shorter than 25 km; 
  22.4% is originated in the 26-50 km range; 
  21.1% in the 51-100 km range; 
  24.9% in the 101-300 km range; 
                                                 
1 Autostrade per l’Italia (2008).   4 
  3.6% in the 301-500 km range; 
  2,2% concerns journeys that are longer than 501 km. 
The imbalance is even stronger as far as the passenger transport on the Italian highways is 
concerned. The data are the following ones: 
  0-25 km: 34.5% 
  26-50 km: 26.0% 
  51-100 km: 18.4% 
  01-300 km: 17.5% 
  301-500 km: 2.4% 
  > 501 km: 1.3%. 
The average length of a journey on the Italian highways is equal to 80 kilometers and 61% 
of the transits in the tollbooths located near the metropolitan areas originate within these 
areas  themselves.  In  other  words  the  large  towns  represent  the  real  bottlenecks  of  the 
network. 
As far as the railroad is concerned, the Italian system suffers from a strong infrastructural 
deficit in comparison with the other large EU Countries. 
 
Table 2 – Indicators of railway equipment in the main European Countriess Total extent  
Countries  Total extent (km) 
Totale extent on the 
territory 
(Germany = 100) 
France  31,385  70.5 
Germany  35,040  100.0 
Italy  16,356  49.4 
UK  16,397  55.0 
Spain  13,869  32.3 
EU-15  153,398  - 
Source: Ance 
 
The Italian transport and logistic system shows values that are twice lower as much its main 
competitors (France and Germany). Framing the issue in the wider scenario of the Common 
Transport Policy, it must be underlined that the main EU idea to transfer traffic volumes of 
passenger  and  freight  transport  from  roads  to  railways  (i.e.:  from  a  polluting  to  an 
environmental friendly mode) is so far failed. As admitted by the European Commission in 
the  Mid-term  Review  of  the  European  Commission’s  2001  Transport  White  Paper   5 
(European Commission 2006), in the last decade the European road transport has grown 
35% and 19% in freight and passenger
2 transports respectively while the rail showed an 
increase of 6% and 9%  in the same segments. In terms of market share, the road freight 
transport covers 44% (showing an increasing trend) of the market as against 10% of the rail 
transport (with a decreasing trend); the situation is even more unbalanced in the passenger 
segment where the road transport market share is equal to 84% against 7% of the rail one. 
Furthermore in the same period the Italian highway network increased by 4.7%, the EU-15 
one by 37.7%, the Spanish one by 111.2%, the German one by 11.4% and the French one 
by 49.8%. Reasoning in perspective terms, in the period 2000-2020 the estimated European 
freight road transport growth is 55%; the rate for the rail freight transport is equal to 13%. 
The evident conclusion is that the Italian roads and highways are going  to be more and 
more “under pressure”. 
A last mention is for the Italian most important ports, which show a worrying situation in 
terms of infrastructures since they are used in the percentage of 90% of the total available 
capacity. A further proof of this difficult condition comes from the analysis of the data of 
the largest Italian ports – Genoa, Trieste and Taranto – which reported small increases in 
the freight transport in comparison with the better performances of several Northern range 
ports. A critical point for the Italian port system is the absence of high capacity railway 
terminals, which are the ideal infrastructures for the receipt of the containers
3. 
The high fragmentation of the Italian port system makes the possibility to improve the  
efficiency  of  the  maritime  transport  very  difficult:  the  total  amount  of  goods  
loaded/unloaded in the three largest Italian ports represents less than 40% of the Rotterdam 
one. 
All these elements considered, it is quite evident that the Italian logistic system suf fers an 
infrastructural gap in comparison with the ones of the other European large Countries:  this 
element may be considered one of the main reasons of the competitiveness deficit of  the 
Italian productive system. As an example, it can be remembered that  the cost of one hour 
wasted in a highway queue amounts to 30 euro for the cars and 50 euro for the  trucks. The 
additional costs deriving by the congestion of the transport and logistic system are equal to 
1.4% of the Italian GNP. A 1% saving in terms of lo gistic costs would imply a 2.5 billion 






                                                 
2 The data refer to the transport by passenger private cars. 
3 This factor is critical in those ports that are specialized in the handling of containers such as Gioia Tauro.  It 
must be considered that the total surface covered by Gioia Tauro port amounts to 6 square kilometers, the one 
by Rotterdam to 105 and the one by Shangai to 3.600.   6 
Table 3 – Main European Ports (2009) on the basis of gross weight of goods handled 
Ranking  Port  Million TONS 
1  Rotterdam (NL)   346.7 
2  Antwerpen (BE)   142.1 
3  Hamburg (DE)  94.8 
4  Marseille (FR)  79.8 
5  Amsterdam (NL)  73.5 
6  Le Havre (FR)  69.2 
7  Bergen (NO)  56.0 
8  Algeciras (ES)  55.8 
9  Immingham (UK)  54.7 
10  Valencia (ES)  48.3 
11  London (UK)  45.4 
12  Genova (IT)  42.7 
13  Bremerhaven (DE)  42.7 
14  Trieste (IT)  41.0 
15  Milford Haven (UK)  39.3 
16  Tees & Hartlepool (UK)  39.2 
17  Göteborg (SE)  38.9 
18  Taranto (IT)  38.1 
19  Dunkerque (FR)  37.9 
20  Southampton (UK)  37.2 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The potential benefits in terms of increase of the productive system competitiveness due to 
the solution of the infrastructural problems of the Italian logistic system are quite evident 
taking into account the data according to which the overall costs of transport and logistics 
represent 20% of the total national value of the industrial production and 11% of the Gross 
National  Product  (Autostrade,  2006).  The  Italian  national  association  of  manufacturing 
firms (Confindustria 2006) estimated the additional costs deriving from the inefficiencies of 
the national logistic system at 7,5 billion euro.  
In brief, the challenges for the Italian logistic system in the future decades are very clear. It 
is absolutely necessary to start effective policies in order to mind the gap with the other 
competitors and to remove the main bottlenecks of the network. In order to take up these 
ambitious challenges, two main knots must be untied, namely the problem of infrastructure 
financing and the impact of the structure of the logistic sector on the overall performance of 
the system. 
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3. Issue n. 1 – Infrastructure financing 
In the complex scenario above described, it must be considered that the present EU member 
State policies for the transport and logistic system are deeply changed in comparison with 
the ones of several decades ago: these sectors, characterized by the strong presence of the 
public hand, represented the ideal target of Keynesian kinds of policy which, by means of 
remarkable and continuous fund injections, pursued both objectives of full occupation and 
social welfare ones. 
The unwelcome effects  of this  policy such as  the public debt  explosion, the numerous 
inflation  tensions  and  the  considerable  increase  of  tax  pressure  aimed  at  maintaining 
unchanged the citizens’ social privileges have been interpreted as clear signals of its failure 
and provided for the rationale to start a Copernican revolution according to which the State 
was – more ore less quickly – substituted by the market. 
Besides the increasing disfavour towards the public oriented political economy approach, 
since  mid-80s’,  a  more  and  more  intense  erosion  action  promoted  by  the  community 
Institutions must be remembered. This process culminated – during the nineties – in the 
fixation of parameters to be respected in order not to be excluded by the European Union 
project. 
This sensibility towards the public spending control has translated in the imposition of 
exogenous constraints to the State freedom in the choice of their political economies. This 
new deal implied that the specific Commission watch dog competences were eventually 
made operative. The final result is a continuous reduction of the public resources available 
to finance the construction of new infrastructures. The statistical data according to which 
the EU Member States are spending less than 1% of their GDP for the funding of the 
transport  infrastructures  compared  to  the  1.5%  of  1980  (European  Commission,  2003) 
contribute to justify the urgency for a deep analysis of the matter. 
This  issue  appears  very  critical  for  those  Member  States,  which  –  as  Italy  –  report 
infrastructure  gap  since  there  is  the  serious  risk  to  witness  a  widening  of  the  network 
development deficit because of the limited availability of resources and that this situation 
could become permanent. In other words, given these conditions, the start of a catching up 
process between the most and the less advanced Countries could be unfeasible. 
As far as this point is concerned, the Italian situation presents a strong divide with the rest 
of the European Countries. In the period 1995-2002, the total fixed capitals expenses for the 
EU-15 decreased from 2.6% to 2.2% of the GNP. The same data in Italy passed from 2.1% 
to 1.8% (Confindustria, 2006). 
In  general,  the  expectable  solution  of  the  shortage  of  public  resource  issue  has  been 
identified in the increasing involvement of the private operators in the financing of the 
infrastructure development. But the analysis of several practical experiences shows that the 
contribution of the private hand in the financing of transport and logistics infrastructures 
met several problems. A good example in this perspective is represented by the projects   8 
envisaged  by  the  Common  Transport  Policy  and  selected  within  the  works  of  the 
Christophersen Group (1993) whose specific task was the support of the European Council 
to identify the infrastructures of national interest: following this activity, 14 projects of 
Community interest were identified. They would have received financial support from the 
Community. What appears quite clearly analyzing this process is that the results have been 
utterly below the expectations: in the first place, only 8 out of the 14 original projects will 
be completed before 2011
4 but, most importantly, a reduced involvement of  the private 
sector in the approved projects may be observed. 
 
3.1 The Public Private Partnership (PPP) as a possible solution 
The issue about the difficulties to involve the private operators suggests it is very useful to 
outline the different natures of the fund raising sources, namely public, private or mixed 
(partnership). The basic case is represented by the direct financing deriving from public 
funds, according to which all risks coming from the various activities – from the design to 
the infrastructure management – are borne by the State. 
However,  it  is  a  strategic  decision  to  find  a  good  balance  between  the  above  quoted 
growing commitments of all Member States to rationalize the financial resources due to the 
deficit  and  debt  parameters  decided  at  the  EU  level  and  the  needs  of  upgrading  the 
infrastructures in order to enhance the competitiveness of the Country. Consequently, it is a 
mandatory choice to adopt innovative forms of fund raising providing for a mix between 
public and private hands trying to involve more and more the private sector. 
This  choice  seems  consistent  with  the  evolution  characterizing  the  public  intervention 
procedures in the economy within the Member States, according to which there is a change 
of  the  role  of  the  public  sector  from  producer  of  goods/services  to  regulator 
(producer/controller of rules: La Spina Majone, 2000).  
Besides the reduction of X-inefficiency, the involvement of the private operators could 
allow the achievement of positive effects in the selection of the infrastructure intervention: 
in fact, the activation of the demand at this stage assures a better comprehension of the 
infrastructure  deficit  and  the  possibility  to  identify  the  best  pattern  under  the  territory 
development point of view. 
An  additional  good  reason  for  the  private  hand  involvement  instead  of  the  public 
centralized management of the top priority projects procedures of identification is the fact 
that the former may assure a better performance in the evaluation of the potential beneficial 
effects  on  the  territory  due  to  the  construction  of  a  transport  infrastructure  (positive 
externalities). 
                                                 
4 Three projects have already been completed (Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Stranraer railway line, Malpensa airport, 
Öresund), 5 should be done by 2011 (Betuwe line, Paris-Bruxelles-Cologne-Amsterdam-London high speed 
train, Greek motorways, UK/Eire/Benelux road link, main railway line along the UK West coast) while only 
some parts of the remaining 6 will be completed by 2010 (Berlin-Verona, South TGV line, East TGV line, 
Lion-Turin-Trieste, Portugal/Spain/Rest of Europe multimodal belt, Nordic triangle).   9 
The operational solution, which is gradually spreading is the intermediate one, namely the 
public private partnership (PPP): a strong support for this choice arises from the persistent 
activity by the European Commission. However, even if EC often expressed its favor for 
this approach, it admitted that the public/private partnership formula has still not been able 
to attract private investors, just as in other cases the inflexibility shown by some States has 
not  encouraged  the  development  of  public/private  partnerships  (European  Commission 
2001, p. 59). 
Although  the  European  documents  emphasize  the  medium-long  term  benefits  of  the 
investments for the Member States, it cannot be ignored that the EU Institutions reduced 
drastically the rooms for manoeuvre of the national Governments by means of the already 
quoted insertion of strict caps to the public resources expenditures. 
In this perspective, the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community law on 
public contracts and concessions (European Commission 2004) must be remembered: its 
main objective consisted in giving an impulse to a debate inspired to provide for a complete 
framework of rules favoring the development of the initiatives financed by PPP. The EC 
main effort must be framed in the wider attempt to offer a landscape of full legal regulatory 
certainty  in  order  to  incentive  the  participation  of  private  operators  in  financing  high 
priority infrastructure projects. 
The acquis communautaire has been enriched thanks to the issue of Directive 18/2004 on 
the  coordination  of  procedures  for  the  award of  public  works  contracts,  public  supply 
contracts and public service contracts, which envisages an accurate and precise discipline 
of  all  different  options  feasible  in  financing  the  infrastructures  and  the  release  of  the 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Public-
Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions (15 
November 2005: European Commission 2005), in which the requirement of producing an 
ad hoc framework of rules for the public private partnership is confirmed. In the same 
direction, the activity of sponsorship for PPP carried by the World Bank must be framed. 
This Institution recently issued a toolkit
5(Fayard 2005) whose main purpose is suggesting 
to  the  national  Governments  wishing  to  put  in  practice  this  choice  the  basic  scenario 
conditions to be respected in order to foster its development. 
A very remarkable experience of the adoption of PPP for the financing of infrastructure is 
the UK one
6: according to the reform launched in 1992  – Autumn Statement  – named 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), the great public works should have been designed, built, 
financed  and  operated  by  private  undertakings  and  afterwards  redeemed  by  the 
Government after a predetermined period (in general 30 years: Sawyer 2005). 
                                                 
5 Fayard  (2005)  identifies  the  advantages  of  PPP  in:  the  higher  efficiency  assured  by  the  private  sector 
involvement  in  terms  of  projects  implementation,  the  possibility  of  adopting  strategies  of  earmarking 
consisting in binding the resources obtained by means of the projects financed and, consequently, creating a 
precise  commitment  for  the  network  manager,  the  establishment  of  incentive  mechanisms  of 
rewards/punishments and transfer of a large part of the risks from the public to the private operator. 
6 Even if the experience is nowadays the butt of several criticisms. 
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According to this model (DBFO), the users do not pay any charge for the use o f the 
infrastructure and the payments for the above quoted activities are transferred by means of 
a yearly fee by the Government to the private undertakings (shadow toll). As occurred for 
all main reforms related to the public intervention in the United Kingdom, also this one has 
been  favored  by  a  remarkable  institutional  project  founded  on   the  creation  of  an 
organization having the task to simplify the development of forms of cooperation between 
public and private organizations (Partnership UK) both creating contacts between these 
two worlds and sharing the ownership of the companies established for the implementation 
of  the  PPP  projects.  Furthermore,  a  governmental  Agency  (Public  Private  Partnership 
Programme Support) identifying the best PPP opportunities for the public sector in the 
whole British territory was set-up. 
 
3.2 The different options available to involve private sector 
A second profile of interest about the involvement of the private hand in the infrastructure 
financing is represented by the nature of the private operators involved: although the debate 
about the privatization is rather advanced, an element that has not been analyzed carefully 
enough is represented just by the influence that the different kind of undertakings involved 
may have on the achievement of the infrastructure development objectives. 
The  private  intervention  is  in  fact  often  considered  as  a  homogeneous  set  in  order  to 
distinguish it by the public one and the recourse to it is justified, as already said, by means 
of arguments related to its structural capacity to reduce the inefficiency that is characteristic 
of the public undertaking and by the necessity to find new sources of financing. 
In this way, it is generally ignored that the label private hand presupposes in reality a wide 
and variegated spectrum of solutions: each of the different options operates according to 
different rationales and may lead to different outcomes with regard to the specific issues of 
the infrastructures. 
As  an  example,  the  issue  of  the  Italian  highways  sector  may  be  remembered  since  it 
provides  for  explicit  restrictions  to  the  presence  of  specific  categories  of  undertakings 
among the shareholders of the concessions-holder companies. As known, in the Italian case, 
a rigorous prohibition for the construction companies to hold shares in the concession-
holder  companies  has  been  introduced  in  order  to  avoid  the  generation  of  conflicts  of 
interest in the auction procedures of contracts for the execution of the network maintenance 
and enlargement. 
On  the  contrary,  an  opposite  kind  of  decision characterizes  other  systems,  such  as  the 
Spanish and the British ones, where the participation of the construction companies is not 
only allowed but also considered the linchpin on which the development of the highway 
road system is focused. 
In general, a first possible pattern of private intervention is represented by those companies 
choosing the Stock Exchange Market quotation and, consequently, the recourse to a wide 
shareholder group in order to find enough resources for the financing of their activities.   11 
This option has often been adopted after the processes of privatization of previously State-
owned companies. The Stock Exchange listing generates for the company the consequent 
issue to be evaluated by the market: this represents for the undertaking an incentive to 
adopt decisions aimed at solving the problem of X-inefficiency. 
The economic theory states that the behavior of a listed company management is subjected 
to numerous factors such as the presence of incent ivizing payment system and the risks 
connected to the possibility of failure and take-over. On the contrary, the undesired effect 
of the Stock Exchange listing consists in overestimating a short-period perspective because 
of the pressure exerted by the shareholders in terms of trend of the stock price and dividend 
distribution: it is evident that this factor represents a critical point in the infrastructural 
industries, characterized by investments whose economic returns are placed on very long 
time horizons. 
A second possibility that is gradually establishing itself in these last years exploits the  
possibility to raise the necessary capitals for the infrastructure financing by means of the  
participation of large international investors (instead of the Stock Exchange listing), namely 
not-listed pension and investment funds. 
These  kinds  of  private  investors  are  endowed  with  huge  abundance  of  cash  and  are  
interested in long-term investments, as the ones in the network industries, which may grant 
a steady and durable – even not very high – level of profitability. 
In order to allow this, it is of course necessary that the risk of sudden changes of the 
regulatory framework, which may influence the return of the investment, is very low. 
Under the operating profile, these players may follow, as a general rule, a twofold pattern in 
order to enter these markets. The straight way is represented by the ownership of shares of 
concession-holder companies/construction companies (very often not listed in the Stock 
Exchange market). 
Moreover, it must be considered that, in practice, the establishment of joint ventures (in 
general  not  listed  in  the  Stock  Exchange  market)  or  the  conclusion  of  partnership 
agreements  in  which  the  distinctive  competences  of  each  participating  operator  are 
enhanced. Against these factors of strength related to the institutional investor intervention, 
a reduced ability to interpret the local needs  and a remarkable risk aversion should be 
considered. 
Besides the typology of the operator and the company shareholder group, there are other 
factors influencing the choice of the channels the necessary resources for the infrastructural 
investment may be drawn from. For instance, also the economic organization of a company 
may have a relevant role in this sense, generating opportunities and constraints.  
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  in  fact  rather  frequent  that  the  operators  interested  in  the 
infrastructural activities are inclined towards vertical integrated configurations. Under the 
theoretical point of view, the rationale of this kind of choice may be traced back to the fact 
that the construction activity represents the essential pillar for the infrastructural sectors and, 
consequently, the maintaining of the control on this stage of the production chain may   12 
consent the achievement of remarkable economies and reduce the criticality arising from 
the coordination of construction operators. 
However, the differentiation in sectors that are economically or geographically contiguous 
may offer several interesting perspectives, too. In more detail, the companies adopting  
these kinds of strategies could – in principle – be able to accept lower profits thanks to the 
possibility to exploit cross subsidies from the businesses characterized by higher levels of 
margin towards the ones where the profitability is lower. 
The acquisition (control of shares) by constructing company of undertakings providing for 
accessory services for the infrastructure could be interpreted in this sense. However, it must 
be remembered that the infrastructure constructing company – either vertically integrated or 
horizontally  differentiated  –  may  obtain  from  the  infrastructural  investment  indirect 
benefits  for  its  ancillary  activities,  which  may  improve  radically  its  economic/financial 
feasibility. 
This  description  of  the  different  shades  the  private  intervention  could  assume  makes 
evident that the choice could have important implications with regard to the issue of the 
infrastructural investment: this observation calls for the necessity to analyze – though very 
briefly – the function a good regulation should carry out in order to select the investor 
profile that is fittest for the purpose. 
The reference is to the previous rows for the analysis of the drawbacks in terms of the 
investment propensity and the orientation towards the short-term of the quoted companies. 
A central element to be carefully considered in order to provide for suggestions about the 
most appropriate operator is identifiable in the kind of infrastructure intervention involved. 
In the abstract and considering the obvious simplifications any attempts to generalize imply, 
it  may  be  stated  that  the  construction  of  a  totally  new  infrastructure  proves  to  be  not 
interesting in terms of profit potentialities for those operators assuming their decisions on a 
short/medium-term perspective. 
On the contrary, the same argumentation does not hold for the intervention of development 
of an existing infrastructure, which needs targeted interventions of an incremental kind 
aimed at expanding the present capacity. The framework tends to change in the case of 
institutional investors, investment funds and pension funds, which, as already observed, 
operate according to a very long-term perspective and, moreover, are inclined to prefer 
investments characterized by certain returns – even if low – and uniform in the years. 
It is self-evident that this observation goes against the traditional approach, which excludes 
aprioristically any possibility of private intervention in networks at embryonic stage: in 
reality, reasoning in terms of incentives, the above quoted typology of investors seems to be 
consistent in contexts where the infrastructure has not been built and needs huge capitals to 
be invested. 
Once  more,  the  reference  to  international  experiences  provides  for  useful  hints;  in  the 
British system, where these solutions have been tested very frequently
7, the typical case 
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provides that the agreements are concluded between one or more investment banks, whose 
specific function is the fund raising activity, one or more construction companies and one 
or more infrastructure manager companies (hard & soft facility management: maintenance 
and ancillary services).  
Attempting a terminological twist, such an articulation seems to resemble a rationale that is 
consistent with a sort of small Japanese keiretsus: the financial institution is the catalyst of 
the whole vertical chain of all necessary companies from the upstream stages (design and 
project) to the downstream ones (maintenance).  
With regard to the vertical integration strategy, the case of the giant Spanish group ACS,  
whose  original  core  business  was  the  construction  of  large  infrastructures  must  be 
remembered; however, since mid nineties’, it started a deep process of forward integration 
aimed at entering the sector of infrastructure management by means of the acquisition of 
operators already active at different stages of the chain (e.g.: Abertis and Sanef). 
Finally,  as  far  as  the  patterns  on  the  horizontal  dimension  are  concerned,  the  strategy 
undertaken by the already quoted ACS group, which completed numerous acquisitions in 
the  port  handling  service  and  logistic  sectors  (Dragados),  waste  recovery  and  disposal 
(Urbaser), production of electricity (Union Fenosa) and freight transport (Continental Auto), 
expanding  its  activity  to  the  water,  telecommunication  and  railway  sectors,  must  be 
remembered. 
Equally,  it  may  be  noticed  very  often  that  the  construction  and  the  management  of 
infrastructure  become  the  main  target  of  huge  groups  coming  from  different  areas  of 
business. A good example in this perspective is Halliburton, one of the world leaders in the 
production of products and services related to the oil drilling, extraction and refining and 
gas transport, which has been very active in the competitive tenders for the contract work 
assignment of transport infrastructures in the United Kingdom.                 
 
4. Issue n. 2 – The logistic sector structure 
The  second  critical  point  to  analyze  in  order  to  understand  the  negative  impact  of  the 
logistics  on  the  level  of  global  competitiveness  of  the  Italian  entrepreneurial  tissue  is 
represented  by  the  structural  characteristics  of  this  sector.  At  this  proposal,  a  brief 
preliminary digression about the impact of the recent changes in the organization of the 
manufacturing process in logistic terms is necessary. 
In the first place, it is well known that the globalization and the productive delocalization 
influenced  drastically  the  organization  of  the  productive  chain,  above  all  making  the 
activities of transport and logistics  activities very important  for the final  supply of the 
goods. Furthermore, the logistic services are more and more often outsourced because of 
the increasing level of specialization of the manufacturing firms: this element generates a 
strong re-organization of the supply chain, according to which each step of the process 
                                                                                                                                                     
roads and motorways for an overall amount of about 3 billion pounds (4,5 billion euros) has been financed: all 
projects has been completed by means of the establishment of partnerships and joint ventures.   14 
(including logistics) is carried out by specialized operators. This factor causes an increase 
in the complexity of the overall manufacturing process and the  need to obtain excellent 
performances in order to reduce the costs, improve the quality of the service
8 and minimize 
the level of stock
9. 
The sources of competitive advantage are thus represented by: the capability to concentrate 
the transports on few journeys, the rationalization of the  number of rides and the points of 
deliveries, the possibility to increase the average dimension of the lots
10 and the provision 
of integrated packages of services. 
 
4.1 Thousands of dwarfs in a world of giants 
The  first  characteristic  element  of  the  Italian  system  that  is  useful  to  underline  is  the 
reduced  inclination  of  the  manufacturing  firms  to  outsource  the  transport  and  logistic 
activities; in general, these tasks are carried out in house by the manufacturing firms for the 
following reasons: 
  because of the lower costs of the road transport, the Italian manufacturing 
undertakings are not incentivized to have recourse to different operators for 
the  logistic  activities.  The  standard  strategies  for  these  small  medium 
enterprises are the purchase of transit vans or, at most, the exploitation of 
“global logistics services”; 
  the Italian firms, due to their low average dimension, are still not endowed 
with enough culture to outsource the stages of the productive process. 
The result is that the overall percentage of the outsourced logistic services by the Italian 
manufacturing firms is equal to 13% while the figures in UK, France and Germany are  
35%,  27%  and  23%  respectively.  Besides  this  peculiarity  on  the  demand  side,  several 
features of the Italian logistic supply must be remembered. The landscape of the national 
entrepreneurial tissue is very complex since a wide variety of operators providing logistic 
services exists. Trying to sum up the main typologies, the first category is represented by 
those  undertakings  performing  only  services  of  postage  and  transport.  This  class  is 
constituted by a very high number of low dimension haulers and several express couriers 
able to perform international deliveries. 
The other large class is represented by the so-called integrated logistic operators, which can 
offer the whole cycle of the logistic services from the management of the stock to the final 
delivery. In addition to these two categories – that are similar to the ones retraceable in all 
national logistic systems – the Italian reality is characterized by the presence of several 
experiences of logistic districts, according to which a number of firms operating on a single 
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logistic platform offers the services of the logistic chain concluding agreements for  the 
performance of the different steps of the process
11. 
As far as the structure of the sector is concerned, the landscape is dominated by the  
presence of a huge number of low dimension operators: to give an idea the total amount  of 
Italian transport firms exceeds 100.000 with an average turnover of 0.4 million Euro. The 
values for the other EU large Countries are very different: about 43,000 and 0.8 for France, 
about 33,000 for UK and Germany with 0.85 and 0.7 respectively (Eurostat, 2008). 
The obvious conclusions of this particular situation are that: the critical mass of the Italian 
logistic  system  is  very  low  and  the  national  logistic  operators  must  face  a  level  of  
competitive pressure they are not trained for. In particular, the huge average dimension of  
the other Countries logistic firms suggests that, short of radical changes in the Italian  
system, the latter is a candidate for a hard crisis. 
 
Table 4 – Main world logistic operators (2010) 
Rank  Operator  TEU   Market share 
1  APM-Maersk  2,514,097  15.9 
2  Mediterranean Shg Co  2,050,971  13.0 
3  CMA CGM Group  1,358,987  8.6 
4  COSCO Container L.  641,678  4.1 
5  Hapag-Lloyd  631,022  4.0 
6  Evergreen Line  615,688  3.9 
7  APL  607,031  3.8 
8  CSCL  524,582  3.3 
9  Hanjin Shipping  482,151  3.1 
10  MOL  432,180  2.7 
Moreover, the European (and world) logistic system is the object of a deep process of 
restructuring according to which a real merging wave may be observed: the critical issue 
for the national system is that the flow of acquisitions is directed in a single sense from 
abroad to Italy. In the period 1992-2005, 43 out of 56 mergers concerned acquisition of 
Italian logistic operators from foreign ones. 
The final effects on the market share are unequivocal: in the last decade, the market share 
of the Italian transport firms as far as the flows of road transport at the borders passed from 
50% to  35.1% and the  same data  for the  air mode decreased from  61% to  23.6% (!); 
meanwhile, the balance of payments deficit for the freight transport passed from 1.3 to 3.2 
billion euro. 
In other words, the land of Italian logistic dwarfs became in the last years a proper ground 
for conquest by foreign (and experienced) giants, which adopted (and will adopt) strategies 
of selective acquisitions to control the most critical infrastructures and operators with the 
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aim of expanding their influence on a very interesting market. The danger for the national 
system is that Italy could play the role of a transit territory, while other European  areas 
benefit from the added value of the logistic activities. The above described reorganization 
of the European logistic chain suggests that the foreign (and huge) operators are the only 
ones that, because of their dimension and competences, are able to provide the services for 
the most profitable segments, thus cream skimming the market and leaving the low margin 
areas to the national operators. 
Moreover, it must be considered that the large dimensions of the foreign operators make the 
entry in their national markets very difficult and these global players are pursuing strategies 
of further dimensional growth by means of internal acquisitions. 
 
4.2 The case of Germany 
Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  this  policy  of  enlargement  –  in  both  national  and 
international perspective – is represented by Germany, whose clear choice has been the 
specialization of several operators in the different areas of logistic activities. 
The direct consequence of such a choice has been a growing dynamism of the German port 
system in the last years, which gained market share and improved the overall performances 
of the logistic services; in this perspective, the port of Hamburg may be quoted: in order to 
better satisfy the new and advanced needs of the customers, at the beginning of the century, 
a program of infrastructural investments was started aimed at improving the intermodal 
linkages between maritime and rail transports. Nowadays, the port of Hamburg is endowed 
with a very efficient system of high capacity rail terminals, whose main function is to 
streamline the changes of transport modes and adopts more and more advanced loading 
systems. 
This is a clear example of the importance to thinking in systemic terms as far as the policies 
to support the logistic systems are concerned. Besides the infrastructure issue, a second 
hinge of the German logistic policy consisted in a strong State support of two specialized 
operators characterized by a very high critical mass. 
The State owned railway undertaking – Deutsche Bahn (DB) – is one of the most important 
global player in the field of the heavy logistics and operates by means of three companies, 
each specialized in a different field. In particular, DB Logistics controls Stinnes (industrial 
logistics), Railion (freight rail transport), Schenker (international integrated logistics) and 
Duss (planning, realization and management of intermodal terminals). 
In perfect consistency with the above quoted strategy of foreign market penetration DB 
Logistics  acquired  English  Welsh  and  Scottish  Railway  –  that  is  the  most  important 
operator  of  rail  freight  transport  with  a  national  market  share  of  75%  and  Transportes 
Ferroviarios Especiales (Transfesa) – a Spanish undertaking operating in the rail transport 
of cars. Furthermore, it concluded a Joint Venture with the Russian Railways RZD aimed at 
performing the service of container transport from Europe to Eastern European Countries.   17 
In order to give an idea of the dimension of this operator, it must be remembered that the  
overall turnover of the group in 2005 amounted to 12 billion euro and the number of  
employees is equal to 64,000. In strategic terms, DUSS manages 26 intermodal terminals 
placed homogeneously in the German territory and, as far as Italy is concerned, is going to 
open a new rail terminal in Verona. 
The second specialized operator is Deutsche Post World Net, which is the world leader in 
the area of light logistcs. The rationale of the conduct adopted by the company is more or 
less  the  same:  since  1999,  Deutsche  Post  has  realized  a  proper  pacman  strategy  as 
witnessed by the 15 acquisitions in the express and logistic segments throughout the world. 
Of course, the most important operation is represented by DHL (2002), which operates in 
two  segments,  namely  Express  (turnover  of  18  billion  euro  and  more  than  130,000 
employees) and Logistics (turnover: 8 billion euro and more than 148.000 employees).  
The group covers more than 200 Countries performing 1.5 billion deliveries by means of a 
capillary network made up of 450 hubs, terminals and stores, 240 gateways, 420 airplanes 
and 76,000 vehicles. 
 





The consequences as far as the general logistic sector is concerned are very interesting: 
according to a research edited by P. Klaus (2003), the value of the whole logistic sector 
amounts to 150 billion euro, the per capita volume of transport in Germany amounts to 45 
tons  (the  European  average  is  31.5)  and  –  more  importantly  –  the  first  ten  companies 
control more than 70% of the total German turnover. Furthermore, in the period 1999-2003, 
more than 100 mergers and acquisitions were concluded in Germany.   18 
Finally, the institutional dimension of the German system must be remembered since it is  
characterized by a well-developed and advanced culture of logistic territorial marketing  
thanks  to  the  presence  of  several  national  projects  and  promotion  Agencies  aimed  at   
creating an ideal scenario for the attraction of investments. In concrete terms, the idea is to 
represent a territory as a potential area of establishment of logistic activities: under this  
point of view, the institutional tasks of an Agency should be the identification of the  
infrastructural  needs  (in  terms  of  physical  facility,  information  and  communication  
technologies, connections with the main transport nodes), the arrangement of the crit ical 
relationships with the local firms and operators and the set-up of an efficient and simple 
institutional, bureaucratic and administrative context. 
A  remarkable  case  is  constituted  by  the  Kompetenzzentrum  Logistik  Kornwestheim  
(KLOK), which is a complex network of private and institutional operators of the logistic 
sector aimed – among the other things – at: solving the main infrastructural issues and 
training the human resources in this perspective, identifying the best practices about the 
local  approaches  deducible  from  other  experiences,  creating  a  European  network  of 
competence  centres  facilitating  synergies  and  the  conclusion  of  agreements  among 
operators and establishing a computer-based platform about European logistic and transport 
activities.   19 
5. Concluding remarks 
The paper described the main causes of the Italian logistic system competitiveness gap: 
starting  from  a  general  condition  of  infrastructure  deficit,  the  shortage  of  financial 
resources and the low average dimension of the logistic operators worsened the situation 
thus making the possibility to plug the gap in a short time very difficult. 
In this awkward scenario, the transition toward a market-oriented economy – that is the EU 
choice – according to which the financial burden of the member States must be reduced and 
the investments should be financed by means of a more and more intense involvement of 
private  operators,  favours  the  strong  systems  thus  widening  the  distance  with  the  less 
developed ones.  In other words, the decision to let the market free to self-regulate the 
allocation of resources would be a suicidal option for the Italian system: accordingly, in 
order to reverse the situation, several drastic changes are necessary, among which the most 
important is the absolute need to work out effective industrial policy interventions. 
At this proposal, a preliminary element to be underlined is the need to change the culture of 
the intervention: the policy measures should be designed following a systemic perspective. 
For this reason, a sort of control room for the logistic sector should be created in order to 
identify the most pressing needs for the national system
12 and coordinate the actions of the 
various local institutions having competences about the implementation of logistic policies. 
As  far  as  the  philosophy  of  the  interventions  is  concerned,  several  factors  must  be  
considered: firstly, most of the congestion problems arise on the urban networks and these  
ones may worsen the overall performance and the punctu ality of the long-range transport 
(the  main  bottlenecks  concern  the  metropolitan  areas);  secondly,  the  road  transport  
maintains a sort of last-mile advantage because of its higher flexibility permitting to carry-
out door-to-door deliveries. 
In this sense, the concept of intermodal competition, according to which the key-idea is to 
create a level the playing field among all the modes aimed at stimulating a market share 
shift towards the clean ones, seems indefensible. Consequently, the decision to address 
resources to the construction of huge projects is capable of producing unsatisfying effects. 
More  seriously,  this  approach  diverts  the  funds  on  expensive  but  not  very  useful 
interventions – which may give political visibility – rather than devoting them to the real 
priorities.  Several  scholars  state  this  top-down  philosophy  of  the  intervention  may  be 
considered a sort of pork-barrel policy. As correctly underlined by sir Rod Eddington in his 
report dated December 2006, “build it and they will come” is a dangerous approach to 
transport projects (HM Treasury 2006, p. 17).  
As regards Italy, a very lively debate about the capacity of the new high-speed rail has 
developed: in particular, it has been pointed out that the overall capacity of the AV/AC
13 
network  could  be  oversized.  This  observation  generates  serious  concerns  about   the 
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economic viability of this huge investment – the total costs have been valued at 32 billion 
Euro – and, if the traffic volumes are not in line with the expectations, the payback period 
will be very long. 
In  this  overall  scenario,  it  is  clear  that  the  decision  about  the  construction  of  the  new 
highspeed connection Turin-Lyon implying costs to the amount of about 20 billion Euro is 
very  ticklish  above  all  considering  the  limited  available  resources  allocated  by  the 
European  Union.  In  this  regards  and  considering  the  overall  framework  of  resource 
shortage, the philosophy of the great EU corridors providing for large investments, the 
involvement of huge capitals and the construction of new infrastructure should be replaced 
with an incremental strategy founded on targeted measures directed to solve the congestion 
in the metropolitan areas (city logistics) and to remove the bottlenecks for the last mile 
interconnections. 
With regard to the financing of infrastructure, two main important changes should be taken 
into account: first of all, there is the absolute need to create an overall scenario of legal and 
regulatory certainty and ideal operative conditions for the attraction of private operators and, 
secondly, following the example of the German system, a strong State support of the main 
logistic operators should be preserved. 
As far as the first issue is concerned, the deepening about the different options of private 
involvement should suggest there is room for different kinds of intervention: accordingly, 
the interest of the public operator should be the arrangement of favourable conditions in 
this sense. What can be called the “Italian disease” – i.e. the bad habit to make sudden U-
turns in the issuing of the rules – implies the private operators are frightened to invest 
resources in the infrastructure development. An institution that is typical of the UK system, 
namely  the  regulatory  contract,  could  be  very  useful:  in  concrete  terms,  the  State  (or 
regulatory  Agency)  undertakes  to  apply  a  certain  regulatory  regime  (tariffs,  control  of 
quality etc.) against the commitment of the operators to build and manage the infrastructure. 
The final objective is to minimize the so-called regulatory risk: unfortunately, several good 
examples of the unintentional effects of the sudden changes of regulatory regimes in terms 
of private operator involvement may be traceable analyzing the Italian transport and logistic 
sectors. 
The characteristics of the infrastructure investments – high payback period and riskiness – 
suggest that certain kinds of operators fit better than others: for instance, the pension and 
investment funds are endowed with the liquidity and the profitability profile necessary for 
these kinds of operations, the diversified undertakings may exploit the returns deriving 
from contiguous segments in order to receive enough compensation for the infrastructure 
investments  and  the  vertical  integrated  company  may  benefit  from  the  achievement  of 
economies of scale in the different stages of the chain. Accordingly, such interventions as 
the removal of all prohibitions for the participation to the infrastructure sector to certain 
companies or the conclusion of agreements with the private operators according to which 
the  State  guarantees  the  possibility  to  exploit  commercially  the  area  concerned  by  the 
infrastructure investment by means of other business in change of the realization of the 
work are necessary.   21 
At last, in the light of the approach developed in the most competitive EU logistic systems 
and considering the weak structure of the Italian industry, a remarkable effort should be put 
in practice aimed at stimulating the growth of one (or two) national   champions of the 
logistics with enough critical mass to face the foreign competition. In this perspective, the 
huge and valuable estate assets owned by the Italian rail company  (Ferrovie dello Stato) 
could be exploited; but this measure would be not efficient if not   accompanied by an 
activity of preliminary identification of the strategic logistic platforms and terminals on the 
Italian territory on which the flows of goods should be concentrated. 
This  ticklish  planning  activity  entails  –  once  more  –  the  need  to  develop  a  systemic 
philosophy as regards the Italian logistic sector. Such an approach has become more and 
more urgent: this deep change of approach may no longer be postponed if the Italian system 
wishes to play an active role in a globalized economy where the importance of logistic 
activities has dizzily grown.    22 
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